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This paper shows how downward simulation can be checked using existing temporal logic model
checkers. In particular, we show how the branching time temporal logic CTL can be used to
encode the standard downward simulation conditions. We do this for both a blocking, or guarded,
interpretation of operations (often used when specifying reactive systems) as well as the more
common non-blocking interpretation of operations used in many state-based speciﬁcation languages
(for modelling sequential systems). The approach is general enough to use with any state-based
speciﬁcation language, and any CTL model checker in which the language can be encoded.
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1 Introduction
Data reﬁnement for state-based formalisms is usually checked by proving that
the concrete system simulates the abstract one [7]. The notion of simulation
is captured by downward and upward simulation rules comprising conditions
relating the possible initialisations and transitions of the concrete and abstract
systems. Proving these conditions by hand, even for simple systems, is at
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best tedious and at worst error-prone. Hence, tool support for proving data
reﬁnements is generally considered necessary.
Most existing tool support involves the use of theorem provers. These tools
require the user to devise most of the proof steps and hence can help the user
gain a deep understanding of the reﬁnement. However, they also require a
great deal of expertise in mathematical proof. Furthermore, when the user is
not able to prove a condition, this may be either because the condition is not
true (and the reﬁnement does not hold), or because the proof required is too
diﬃcult for the user (and the reﬁnement may hold). Distinguishing between
these two cases is often diﬃcult [4].
Model checking [3], as opposed to theorem proving, is a fully automatic
technique for determining whether a speciﬁed system satisﬁes a given property.
A model checker exhaustively checks the state space of a system to determine
whether or not the property holds. In the latter case, a model checker will
usually provide a counter-example, or witness, providing insight into why the
property does not hold.
Model checkers were originally restricted to ﬁnite systems, and to simple
notations suited to modelling systems where the complexity lay in the control
structure, rather than the data, e.g., hardware systems and communication
protocols. Recent advances mean that these restrictions are no longer abso-
lute. Automatic techniques for property-preserving abstraction [10,16,2] and
bounded model checking [5] are two means of allowing systems with inﬁnite
state spaces to be checked. Powerful automatic decision procedures allow
model-checker languages to support high-level speciﬁcation constructs such as
lambda expressions, set comprehensions and universal and existential quanti-
ﬁers [6]. Hence, it is possible to model check speciﬁcations written in high-level
languages [18].
It has become possible therefore to consider using model checkers to prove
data reﬁnements. There are two main challenges in doing so. Firstly, a model
checker expects a single system on which to check properties. Hence, we need
to combine the abstract and concrete systems into one system. Secondly, the
properties checked are usually behavioural properties, i.e., properties of paths
through the system’s states. Therefore, we need to express the simulation
conditions as behavioural properties. How this is done depends on how the
abstract and concrete systems are combined. Hence, the two challenges are
interrelated.
We have found that the branching time temporal logic CTL [8] is par-
ticularly suited to modelling simulation rules. In this paper, we show how
CTL model checkers, e.g., NuSMV [1] or SAL [5], can be used to check the
standard conditions for downward simulation. We do this both for systems
G. Smith, J. Derrick / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 137 (2005) 205–224206
with a blocking, or guarded, interpretation of operations, as well as those
with the more common non-blocking interpretation [7]. We plan to extend
the approach to upward simulation in future work. In Section 2, we introduce
the temporal logic CTL. In Section 3, we describe how downward simulation
can be checked under a blocking semantics, and in Section 4 extend these
ideas to a non-blocking semantics. Our approach is not speciﬁc to a particu-
lar state-based speciﬁcation language nor a particular CTL model checker. In
Section 5, we discuss our experience with instantiating our approach with Z
speciﬁcations [20] in SAL. We conclude in Section 6.
2 CTL
Temporal logics are used to deﬁne properties of Kripke structures. Kripke
structures are essentially state transitions systems with a total transition re-
lation, i.e., where every state has at least one transition enabled. An inﬁnite
sequence of states through a Kripke structure (where each state is related to
its successor by the transition relation) is referred to as a path.
CTL [8] is a branching time temporal logic meaning that its formulae are
interpreted over all paths beginning in a given state of the Kripke structure.
We write M , s0  f to denote that for Kripke structure M , the CTL formula
f holds in state s0.
Syntactically, we divide CTL formulae into three categories:
(i) those whose outermost operator, if any, is not a temporal operator,
(ii) those whose outer most operator is a temporal operator (X (next), U
(until), F (eventually) or G (always)) preﬁxed with the existential path
quantiﬁer E, and
(iii) those whose outer most operator is a temporal operator preﬁxed with
the universal path quantiﬁer A.
The formulae in category (i) comprise atomic propositions on the states of
the Kripke structure, as well as logical combinations of other CTL formulae
from categories (i), (ii) and (iii). Speciﬁcally, if f1 and f2 are CTL formulae
then so are ¬ f1, f1 ∧ f2, f1 ∨ f2, f1 ⇒ f2 and f1 ⇔ f2.
The formulae in category (ii) express properties which are true on at least
one path of the Kripke structure M starting from s0. For example, EX f1,
where f1 is a CTL formula, states that for at least one path starting from
the state s0, f1 holds in the next state. Similarly, E[f1 U f2] states that for at
least one path starting from s0, f1 holds until some state where f2 holds. Also,
EF f1 states that for at least one path starting from s0, f1 eventually holds,
and EG f1 states that for at least one path starting from s0, f1 always holds.
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The formulae in category (iii) express properties which are true on all
paths of M starting from s0. For example, AX f1, where f1 is a CTL formula,
states that for all paths starting from the state s0, f1 holds in the next state.
Similarly, A[f1 U f2] states that for all paths starting from s0, f1 holds until
some state where f2 holds. Also, AF f1 states that for all paths starting from
s0, f1 eventually holds, and AG f1 states that for all paths starting from s0, f1
always holds.
More formally, the semantics of the CTL formulae introduced above can
be given as follows (where p is an atomic proposition and f1 and f2 are CTL
formulae).
Semantics of CTL
(i) M , s0  p iﬀ p is true on s0
M , s0  ¬ f1 iﬀ not M , s0  f1
M , s0  f1 ∧ f2 iﬀ M , s0  f1 and M , s0  f2
M , s0  f1 ∨ f2 iﬀ M , s0  ¬ (¬ f1 ∧ ¬ f2)
M , s0  f1 ⇒ f2 iﬀ M , s0  ¬ f1 ∨ f2
M , s0  f1 ⇔ f2 iﬀ M , s0  (f1 ⇒ f2) ∧ (f2 ⇒ f1)
(ii) M , s0  EX f1 iﬀ for some path (s0, s1, . . .), M , s1  f1
M , s0  E[f1 U f2] iﬀ for some path (s0, s1, . . .),
there exists an i ,
M , si  f2 and
for all j < i , M , sj  f1
M , s0  EF f1 iﬀ M , s0  E[true U f1]
M , s0  EG f1 iﬀ M , s0  ¬ AF ¬ f1
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(iii) M , s0  AX f1 iﬀ for all paths (s0, s1, . . .), M , s1  f1
M , s0  A[f1 U f2] iﬀ for all paths (s0, s1, . . .),
there exists an i ,
M , si  f2 and
for all j < i , M , sj  f1
M , s0  AF f1 iﬀ M , s0  A[true U f1]
M , s0  AG f1 iﬀ M , s0  ¬ EF ¬ f1
3 Blocking semantics
The blocking, or guarded, semantics of state-transition systems is usually
adopted for speciﬁcations of reactive systems. Under this semantics, an oper-
ation has a guard outside of which it cannot occur, i.e., it is ‘blocked’ outside
the guard. It has been used for state-based notations aimed speciﬁcally at
concurrent systems [12,17].
Let a speciﬁed system comprise a set of states S , a non-empty set of initial
states I ⊆ S , and a ﬁnite set of operations, or transitions, {Op1, . . . ,Opn},
each of which is a relation between states in S 3 . Under the blocking semantics,
downward simulation is then deﬁned as follows [7].
Deﬁnition 3.1 A speciﬁcation C = (CS ,CI , {COp1, . . . ,COpn}) is a down-
ward simulation of a speciﬁcation A = (AS ,AI , {AOp1, . . . ,AOpn}), if there
exists a retrieve relation R between AS and CS such that the following hold
for all i ∈ 1 . . n.
(i) ∀ c ∈ CI • ∃ a ∈ AI • a R c
(ii) ∀ a ∈ AS ; c ∈ CS •
a R c ⇒ ((∃ a ′ ∈ AS • a AOpi a
′) ⇔ (∃ c ′ ∈ CS • c COpi c
′))
(iii) ∀ a ∈ AS ; c, c ′ ∈ CS •
a R c ∧ c COpi c
′ ⇒ (∃ a ′ ∈ AS • a ′ R c ′ ∧ a AOpi a
′)
Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 3.1 is known as initialisation. It requires that
for every concrete initial state there is an initial abstract state related by the
retrieve relation R.
Condition 2 is known as applicability . It requires that the abstract oper-
ations are only enabled in states related to concrete states where the corre-
3 Input and output parameters of operations can be embedded in the states of S as de-
scribed by Smith and Winter [19].
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sponding concrete operations are enabled, and vice versa.
Condition 3 is known as correctness. It requires that whenever a concrete
operation can result in a state change (t , t ′), for any abstract state s related
to t , the corresponding abstract operation can result in (s , s ′) such that s ′ is
related to t ′. That is, the eﬀect of the concrete operation is consistent with
the requirements of the corresponding abstract operation.
3.1 General approach
In this section, we discuss a general approach to checking downward simula-
tions under a blocking semantics with a CTL model checker. We ﬁrst provide
systems for checking each of the downward simulation conditions individually.
We then combine these systems into one in which all the conditions can be
checked simultaneously. This latter system can also be used to check the con-
ditions individually; something which is useful for ﬁnding problems when a
reﬁnement does not hold.
We have only considered constraints in our models that are necessary for
checking the conditions. Further constraints could be added to make the
state spaces of the models smaller, and hence model checking more eﬃcient.
Determining the optimal constraints to achieve this end, however, is left as
future work.
To illustrate our approach, consider the following simple abstract and con-
crete speciﬁcations given in the style of Z [20]. The abstract system has a
variable x which is initially 0 and may be incremented by 1 or 2. The con-
crete system has a variable y which is initially 0 and may be incremented by
1. Both systems have an upper bound on their variables of 10.
A =̂ [x : 0 . . 10]
AInit =̂ [A | x = 0]
AOp =̂ [∆A | x ′ = x + 1 ∨ x ′ = x + 2]
C =̂ [y : 0 . . 10]
CInit =̂ [C | y = 0]
COp =̂ [∆C | y ′ = y + 1]
The speciﬁcation C in this example is a downward simulation of A under the
retrieve relation x = y .
As mentioned in the introduction, we need to combine these systems in
order to check the simulation conditions. As would be expected, the conditions
of Deﬁnition 3.1 refer to both the abstract and concrete states. Hence, a
combined system must have access to both. We will assume the state variables
of the abstract and concrete systems are disjoint as in the example above. If
they were not, they could be made disjoint by a systematic renaming. For
example, a variable x could be renamed to A.x in the abstract speciﬁcation
and C .x in the concrete speciﬁcation. The combined state can then include the
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variables from both systems. For our example, we would have the declarations
x : 0..10 and y : 0 . . 10 in the state of our combined system.
3.1.1 Initialisation
We begin by considering the initialisation condition. This condition requires
that for each concrete initial state, we are able to ﬁnd an abstract initial state
related by the retrieve relation R. Hence, we require a means of having access
to all concrete initial states in our combined system. One way to do this
is to initialise the combined system so that the concrete part of the state is
initialised. For our example, our combined system’s state would be
Minit =̂ [x : 0 . . 10; y : 0 . . 10]
and would be initialised as follows.
Initinit =̂ [Minit | y = 0]
To check whether an abstract initial state related to a given concrete initial
state exists, we introduce an operation InitAinit which changes the abstract
part of the state to an initial value and leaves the concrete part unchanged.
For our example, this would be the following.
InitAinit =̂ [∆Minit | x
′ = 0 ∧ y ′ = y ]
Note that since InitAinit is enabled in any state, the transition relation is
total as required for a Kripke structure. This will be true for any abstract
speciﬁcation except degenerate cases where there are no abstract initial states.
For now, we will assume that the user will not provide such degenerate abstract
speciﬁcations. We will return to this issue at the end of this section.
Given the above operation, the initialisation condition holds if the opera-
tion can be performed such that the resulting abstract and concrete parts of
the state are related by R. For our example, this check is expressed in CTL
as follows.
EX x = y
That is, there exists a next state such that x = y . Note that the CTL operator
EX allows us to determine whether it is possible to perform an operation and
reach a particular state. This ability to existentially quantify over next states
is what makes CTL particularly useful for capturing simulation conditions.
If there were more than one abstract initial state, then the use of EX above
means that only one of these need be related to the concrete initial state.
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Our approach to checking initialisation is summarised (in a Z style) below:
A and C represent the abstract and concrete states, respectively, AInit and
CInit represent the abstract and concrete initialisations, respectively, and R
represents the retrieve relation.
System: Minit =̂ [A; C ]
Initinit =̂ [Minit | CInit ]
InitAinit =̂ [∆Minit | AInit ∧ ΞC ]
Initialisation check: EX R
3.1.2 Applicability
We now consider the applicability condition. To check applicability, we need to
be able to determine whether each of the abstract and concrete operations can
occur. CTL only allows propositions referring to state variables, however, not
operations. Hence, we introduce a variable ev to the combined state to denote
the name of the last operation that occurred, and we use a diﬀerent font for
the values of type ev . For our example, the state of the combined system for
checking applicability is as follows (the Choose operation is explained below).
Mapp =̂ [x : 0 . . 10; y : 0 . . 10; ev : {AOp,COp,Choose}]
The applicability condition requires that an abstract operation can occur
from an abstract state exactly when the corresponding concrete operation
can occur from a concrete state related to the abstract state by the retrieve
relation R. Hence, we require a means of having access to all combined states
where the abstract and concrete parts are related. Note that the condition
does not require the abstract and concrete states to be reachable; a point we
will return to in Section 5. Once again we can do this by an appropriate
initialisation of our combined system; in this case, to all states where R holds.
For our example, we would initialise the combined system as follows. (The
initial value of ev is not important and is left unspeciﬁed.)
Initapp =̂ [Mapp | x = y ]
We then introduce operations corresponding to the abstract and concrete
operations. For our example, we have the following.
AOpapp =̂ [∆Mapp | (x
′ = x + 1 ∨ x ′ = x + 2) ∧ ev ′ = AOp]
COpapp =̂ [∆Mapp | y
′ = y + 1 ∧ ev ′ = COp]
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Since, in general, there will not be an operation enabled in all states, e.g.,
for the example, neither AOpapp nor COpapp are enabled when x = 10 and
y = 10, we need to introduce a further operation to ensure the transition
relation is total. This operation Choose is always enabled and simply chooses
a new state; the actual state is not important and is left unspeciﬁed.
Chooseapp =̂ [∆Mapp | ev
′ = Choose]
The speciﬁcation now represents a Kripke structure and the applicabil-
ity condition holds if whenever an abstract operation can be performed, the
corresponding concrete operation can be performed, and vice versa. For our
example, this check can be expressed in CTL as follows.
EX (ev = AOp) ⇔ EX (ev = COp)
(Note that we write ev = AOp and not ev = AOpapp since the type of ev is a
set of names, not the actual operations themselves.)
Our approach to checking applicability is summarised (in Z style) below:
AOp1, . . . ,AOpn represent the abstract operations and COp1, . . . ,COpn, the
corresponding concrete operations.
System: Mapp =̂ [A; C ; ev : {AOp1, . . . ,AOpn,COp1, . . . ,COpn,Choose}]
Initapp =̂ [Mapp | R]
AOp1,app =̂ [∆Mapp | AOp1 ∧ ev
′ = AOp1]
...
AOpn,app =̂ [∆Mapp | AOpn ∧ ev
′ = AOpn]
COp1,app =̂ [∆Mapp | COp1 ∧ ev
′ = COp1]
...
COpn,app =̂ [∆Mapp | COpn ∧ ev
′ = COpn]
Chooseapp =̂ [∆Mapp | ev
′ = Choose]
Applicability check: (EX (ev = AOp1) ⇔ EX (ev = COp1)) ∧
...
(EX (ev = AOpn) ⇔ EX (ev = COpn))
3.1.3 Correctness
We ﬁnally come to correctness. As with applicability, we need to be able to
refer to the occurrence of operations to check correctness. Hence, we again
introduce a variable ev to denote the last operation that occurred. The state
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of the combined system for our example is as for checking the applicability
condition.
Mcorr =̂ Mapp
The correctness condition requires that an abstract operation can occur
from an abstract state when the corresponding concrete operation can occur
from a concrete state related to the abstract state by the retrieve relation R.
Hence, again we initialise our combined system to states where R holds. For
our example, we would initialise the combined system as for the applicability
condition.
Initcorr =̂ Initapp
The correctness condition requires, furthermore, that any state reached by
performing the concrete operation is related by R to an abstract state reached
by performing the abstract operation. We can capture this in CTL if the
operations in the combined system corresponding to the abstract operations
do not change the concrete state, and those corresponding to the concrete
operations do not change the abstract state. That is, for our example, we
have the following operations.
AOpcorr =̂ [AOpapp | y
′ = y ]
COpcorr =̂ [COpapp | x
′ = x ]
This allows us to perform the operations COpcorr and AOpcorr in sequence
so that the abstract part of the ﬁnal state reached is identical to that which
could have been reached by performing only AOpcorr , and the concrete part is
identical to that which could have been reached by performing only COpcorr .
We again need a ‘choose’ operation to ensure the transition relation is
total.
Choosecorr =̂ Chooseapp
The correctness condition then holds if, after a concrete operation is per-
formed, the corresponding abstract operation can be performed and result in
a state where R holds. For our example, this check can be expressed in CTL
as follows.
AX (ev = COp ⇒ EX (ev = AOp ∧ x = y))
Note the use of the CTL operator AX to ensure that all post-states of COpcorr
are considered. The EX operator is in the scope of the AX operator and hence
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quantiﬁes over next states of states reached by performing COpcorr . (For this
reason we need not be concerned with the value of ev after the initialisation,
since the AX looks at only those states reached by performing COpcorr .)
Our approach to checking correctness is summarised (in Z style) below.
System: Mcorr =̂ [A; C ; ev : {AOp1, . . . ,AOpn,COp1, . . . ,COpn,Choose}]
Initcorr =̂ [Mcorr | R]
AOp1,corr =̂ [∆Mcorr | AOp1 ∧ ΞC ∧ ev
′ = AOp1]
...
AOpn,corr =̂ [∆Mcorr | AOpn ∧ ΞC ∧ ev
′ = AOpn]
COp1,corr =̂ [∆Mcorr | COp1 ∧ ΞA ∧ ev
′ = COp1]
...
COpn,corr =̂ [∆Mcorr | COpn ∧ ΞA ∧ ev
′ = COpn]
Choosecorr =̂ [∆Mcorr | ev
′ = Choose]
Correctness check: AX (ev = COp1 ⇒ EX (ev = AOp1 ∧ R)) ∧
...
AX (ev = COpn ⇒ EX (ev = AOpn ∧ R))
3.1.4 Downward simulation
We have shown how to construct three systems each of which can be used
to check one of the downward simulation conditions. To check all conditions
simultaneously, we now propose a system which combines those above.
The only diﬀerence between the system for the applicability condition Mapp
and that for the correctness condition Mcorr , is the inclusion in Mcorr of the
constraint that abstract states do not change in the operations corresponding
to the concrete operations, and vice versa. These constraints have no eﬀect
on the verity of the CTL formula for checking applicability. Hence, both
applicability and correctness can be checked on Mcorr .
To check the initialisation condition requires the addition of the InitA
operation. It must also be included in the type of ev to allow transitions
corresponding to the operation to be identiﬁed. For our example, the state
required is as follows.
Mds =̂ [x : 0 . . 10; y : 0 . . 10; ev : {InitA,AOp,COp,Choose}]
The initialisation check also requires a diﬀerent set of initial states. To
accommodate all checks, we widen the initialisation to allow all required initial
states. For our example, the initialisation is as follows.
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Initds =̂ [Mds | (y = 0 ∨ x = y)]
The operations appear as before, except for the inclusion of the predicate
ev ′ = InitA in InitA. For our example, we have the following.
InitAds =̂ [∆Mds | x
′ = 0 ∧ y ′ = y ∧ ev ′ = InitA]
AOpds =̂ [∆Mds | (x
′ = x + 1 ∨ x ′ = x + 2) ∧ y ′ = y ∧ ev ′ = AOp]
COpds =̂ [∆Mds | y
′ = y + 1 ∧ x ′ = x ∧ ev ′ = COp]
Chooseds =̂ [∆Mds | ev
′ = Choose]
We can then check each of the conditions as before, when restricted to
the appropriate initial states. For our example, the initialisation check is
performed on initial states in which y = 0.
y = 0 ⇒ EX (ev = InitA ∧ x = y)
The applicability check is performed on states in which x = y .
x = y ⇒ (EX (ev = AOp) ⇔ EX (ev = COp))
Similarly, the correctness check is performed on states in which x = y .
x = y ⇒ AX (ev = COp ⇒ EX (ev = AOp ∧ x = y))
Our approach to checking downward simulation is summarised (in Z style)
below.
System: Mds =̂ [A; C ;
ev : {InitA,AOp1, . . . ,AOpn,COp1, . . . ,COpn,Choose}]
Initds =̂ [Mds | CInit ∨ R]
InitAds =̂ [∆Mds | AInit ∧ ΞC ∧ ev
′ = InitA]
AOp1,ds =̂ [∆Mds | AOp1 ∧ ΞC ∧ ev
′ = AOp1]
...
AOpn,ds =̂ [∆Mds | AOpn ∧ ΞC ∧ ev
′ = AOpn]
COp1,ds =̂ [∆Mds | COp1 ∧ ΞA ∧ ev
′ = COp1]
...
COpn,ds =̂ [∆Mds | COpn ∧ ΞA ∧ ev
′ = COpn]
Chooseds =̂ [∆Mds | ev
′ = Choose]
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Downward simulation check:
(CInit ⇒ EX (ev = InitA ∧ R))
∧
(R ⇒ (EX (ev = AOp1) ⇔ EX (ev = COp1) ∧
...
EX (ev = AOpn) ⇔ EX (ev = COpn)))
∧
(R ⇒ AX (ev = COp1 ⇒ EX (ev = AOp1 ∧ R)) ∧
...
AX (ev = COpn ⇒ EX (ev = AOpn ∧ R)))
The Choose operation ensures that the transition relation is total as re-
quired. Hence, this approach will work even for degenerate abstract speciﬁ-
cations in which there are no initial states. Alternatively, we could make the
existence of abstract initial states a requirement on the approach, and hence
be able to remove the Choose operation from the system above.
4 Non-blocking semantics
The non-blocking semantics of state-transitions systems is the most common
one. It is used for most popular state-based speciﬁcation languages such as Z
[20]. Under this semantics, an operation has a precondition outside of which
its behaviour is undeﬁned. Its main use is in the speciﬁcation of sequential
systems.
Given a system as described at the beginning of Section 3, under a non-
blocking semantics, downward simulation is deﬁned as follows [7].
Deﬁnition 4.1 A speciﬁcation C = (CS ,CI , {COp1, . . . ,COpn}) is a down-
ward simulation of a speciﬁcation A = (AS ,AI , {AOp1, . . . ,AOpn}), if there
exists a retrieve relation R between AS and CS such that the following hold
for all i ∈ 1 . . n.
(i) ∀ c ∈ CI • ∃ a ∈ AI • a R c
(ii) ∀ a ∈ AS ; c ∈ CS •
a R c ⇒ ((∃ a ′ ∈ AS • a AOpi a
′) ⇒ (∃ c ′ ∈ CS • c COpi c
′))
(iii) ∀ a ∈ AS ; c, c ′ ∈ CS •
(∃ a ′ ∈ AS • a AOpi a
′) ∧ a R c ∧ c COPi c
′ ⇒
(∃ a ′ ∈ AS • a ′ R c ′ ∧ a AOpi a
′)
Condition 1 of Deﬁnition 4.1 is the initialisation condition. It requires that
for every concrete initial state there is an initial abstract state related by the
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retrieve relation R.
Condition 2 is the applicability condition. It requires that abstract oper-
ations are only enabled in states related to concrete states where the corre-
sponding concrete operations are enabled.
Condition 3 is the correctness condition. It requires that whenever a con-
crete operation can result in a state change (t , t ′), for any abstract state s
related to t , if the corresponding abstract operation is enabled then it can
result in (s , s ′) such that s ′ is related to t ′.
4.1 General approach
The general approach to checking downward simulation under a non-blocking
semantics using a CTL model checker is very similar to that for a blocking
semantics. We use the same systems for the individual conditions, as well as
for checking all the conditions simultaneously.
4.1.1 Initialisation
The initialisation condition is identical to that of the blocking semantics.
Hence, it is checked in an identical fashion.
4.1.2 Applicability
The applicability condition only diﬀers from that of the blocking semantics
by having implication rather than equivalence between the predicates stating
that the abstract and concrete operations are enabled. Under the same system
Mapp used for the blocking semantics, we can express the applicability check
for our example of the previous section as follows.
EX (ev = AOp) ⇒ EX (ev = COp)
More generally, for abstract operations AOp1, . . . ,AOpn and corresponding
concrete operations COp1, . . . ,COpn, we have the following CTL formula.
(EX (ev = AOp1) ⇒ EX (ev = COp1)) ∧
...
(EX (ev = AOpn) ⇒ EX (ev = COpn))
4.1.3 Correctness
The correctness condition is similar to that of the blocking model but has
an extra antecedent which requires that the abstract operation is enabled.
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This is required since abstract operations are not always enabled when the
corresponding concrete ones are.
Under the same system Mcorr used for the blocking semantics, we can
express the correctness check for our example of the previous section as follows
(again remembering ev is a set of names).
EX (ev = AOp) ⇒ AX (ev = COp ⇒ EX (ev = AOp ∧ x = y))
More generally, we have the following CTL formula (where R represents
the retrieve relation).
(EX (ev = AOp1) ⇒ AX (ev = COp1 ⇒ EX (ev = AOp1 ∧ R))) ∧
...
(EX (ev = AOpn) ⇒ AX (ev = COpn ⇒ EX (ev = AOpn ∧ R)))
Recall that in this model for correctness, Mcorr is initialised with R true,
that is we are already in a state where A and C are related by the retrieve
relation. Hence it is not necessary to preﬁx the formulae with R ⇒. However,
it is necessary below because the model for downward simulation, Mds , can be
initialised with either R true or CInit true.
4.1.4 Downward simulation
To check all the conditions simultaneously, we follow the approach explained
for the blocking semantics. The general CTL formula for downward simulation
checking is the following (where CInit represents the concrete initialisation).
(CInit ⇒ EX (ev = InitA ∧ R))
∧
(R ⇒ (EX (ev = AOp1) ⇒ EX (ev = COp1)) ∧
...
(EX (ev = AOpn) ⇒ EX (ev = COpn)))
∧
(R ⇒ (EX (ev = AOp1) ⇒ AX (ev = COp1 ⇒ EX (ev = AOp1 ∧ R)))
∧
...
(EX (ev = AOpn) ⇒ AX (ev = COpn ⇒ EX (ev = AOpn ∧ R))))
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5 Discussion
The approach presented in the previous section can be applied to any state-
based speciﬁcation language and any CTL model checker which supports the
speciﬁcation language. We have experimented with the approach using Z and
its encoding in SAL [18].
So far our experiments have not utilised the full power of the SAL tools.
We have therefore been restricted to speciﬁcations with a ﬁnite and relatively
small state space. SAL supports many optimisations features, as well as a
variable abstraction facility which can eﬀectively be used to ignore variables
not inﬂuencing a property we wish to prove. These features need to be investi-
gated as a means of extending the size of the speciﬁcations we can handle. In
addition, future versions of SAL are expected to support predicate abstraction
[10,16,2]; we view this as essential for using our approach with much larger
examples.
Using SAL we have been able to detect subtle errors with a minimum
of eﬀort once the speciﬁcations have been written in the appropriate input
format. For example, in an initial version of the example on pp 271-273 of
[21] the retrieve relation was too weak 4 which was not immediately obvious
without resorting to completing the entire proof. The encoding of downward
simulations in SAL picked up on the error with ease, although deciphering the
counter-example required some understanding of the problem.
We are not the ﬁrst to detect this error using tool support. It was previ-
ously discovered by Robinson who developed a means of automatically check-
ing downward simulations using the Possum Z animator [15]. His approach
relies on Possum’s ability to evaluate complex Z predicates involving quan-
tiﬁcation over the abstract and concrete speciﬁcations’ states. We have also
encoded Robinson’s approach in SAL and, while it is more eﬃcient for very
small state spaces, it becomes computationally more expensive than our ap-
proach when the size of the state space increases.
The issue in the above example was due to the retrieve relation not covering
unreachable states, whereas the speciﬁcations were, in fact, related by down-
ward simulation under a strengthened retrieve relation. We conjecture that
this is a commonly occurring error since speciﬁers are usually more focused
on the reachable states of their systems.
Unreachable states do not aﬀect whether one speciﬁcation is a downward
simulation of another. The reason the downward simulation conditions con-
sider unreachable states is that otherwise the reachable states would need to
4 The error was corrected by the addition of the invariant to one of the speciﬁcations in
subsequent versions of the text.
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be calculated as part of discharging the conditions. This is not something eas-
ily done by hand, or with a theorem prover. It is, however, an intrinsic part of
the model checking process, i.e., since model checking involves an exhaustive
search over a system’s (reachable) state space. Hence, we could restrict our
approach to only check reachable states and, therefore, only require a retrieve
relation that relates reachable states; one that would arguably ﬁt better with
the speciﬁer’s view of the system.
We would thus not be checking the full downward simulation conditions;
however, the restriction to reachable states is suﬃcient to know that one spec-
iﬁcation is a downward simulation of another.
To do this, we would need to initialise the system to one in which the
concrete state is initialised and not allow abstract operations to be performed
before the operation which initialises the abstract state. This could be done by
the inclusion of a “Boolean” variable b denoting whether or not the abstract
state has been initialised as follows.
Mreach =̂ [A; C ; b : {0, 1};
ev : {Init, InitA,AOp1, . . . ,AOpn,COp1, . . . ,COpn,Choose}]
Initreach =̂ [Mreach | CInit ∧ b = 0 ∧ ev = Init]
InitAreach =̂ [∆Mreach | b = 0 ∧ AInit ∧ ΞC ∧ b
′ = 1 ∧ ev ′ = InitA]
AOp1,reach =̂ [∆Mreach | b = 1 ∧ AOp1 ∧ ΞC ∧ b
′ = b ∧ ev ′ = AOp1]
...
AOpn,reach =̂ [∆Mreach | b = 1 ∧ AOpn ∧ ΞC ∧ b
′ = b ∧ ev ′ = AOpn]
COp1,reach =̂ [∆Mreach | COp1 ∧ ΞA ∧ b
′ = b ∧ ev ′ = COp1]
...
COpn,reach =̂ [∆Mreach | COpn ∧ ΞA ∧ b
′ = b ∧ ev ′ = COpn]
Choosereach =̂ [∆Mreach | ev
′ = Choose]
Then, all states in Mreach would comprise reachable abstract and concrete
states.
Since the initial state of Mreach is restricted to those where the concrete
part of the state is initialised, the condition for checking initialisation would
be simpliﬁed as follows.
EX (ev = InitA ∧ R)
The applicability and correctness conditions would need to be modiﬁed so
that the checks are performed on all states in M where R holds. This can
be done for the non-blocking model by simply preﬁxing the formulae with the
temporal operator AG.
Applicability would be checked by the following formula.
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AG (R ⇒ (EX (ev = AOp1) ⇒ EX (ev = COp1)) ∧
...
(EX (ev = AOpn) ⇒ EX (ev = COpn)))
Similarly, correctness would be checked by the following formula.
AG (R ⇒
(EX (ev = AOp1) ⇒ AX (ev = COp1 ⇒ EX (ev = AOp1 ∧ R)))
∧
...
(EX (ev = AOpn) ⇒ AX (ev = COpn ⇒ EX (ev = AOpn ∧ R))))
For the blocking model, we would additionally have to check that b = 1
in the antecedent of the applicability and correctness checks. This is not
necessary in the formulae above due to antecedents of the form EX (ev =
AOp) which imply that b = 1.
We conclude this section with a brief discussion of another approach to
automatically checking state-based reﬁnement. There have been a number
of encoding of subsets of Z-based languages in the CSP model checker FDR
[9,14,13]. FDR is not a temporal logic model checker. Rather, it checks
that reﬁnement holds between two speciﬁcations. It does this by comparing
the failures/divergences semantics of the speciﬁcations; an approach which is
equivalent to simulation-based reﬁnement [12,11].
This approach has the advantage that no retrieve relation is required. How-
ever, since it is not possible to check individual simulation conditions, ﬁnding
problems when reﬁnements do not hold may be more diﬃcult. Also, since
FDR was developed for a process algebra, rather than a state-based notation,
encoding such notations is more diﬃcult; to date, there is no full encoding of
Z in FDR for example. We see the two approaches as being complementary.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how downward simulation can be checked using
existing temporal logic model checkers. In particular, we have shown how
the branching time temporal logic CTL can be used to encode the standard
downward simulation conditions. We did this for both a blocking, or guarded,
interpretation of operations (often used when specifying reactive systems) as
well as the more common non-blocking interpretation of operations used in
many state-based speciﬁcation languages (for modelling sequential systems).
We have used the approach to check downward simulation between Z spec-
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iﬁcations using the SAL CTL model checker. The approach, however, is gen-
eral enough to use with any state-based speciﬁcation language, and any CTL
model checker in which the language can be encoded. We envisage the ap-
proach becoming more applicable as it takes advantage of the current eﬀorts
in the temporal logic model checking community to extend model checking to
systems with larger, and even inﬁnite, state spaces.
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